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Case No. 20090318-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
SCOTT TYLER STAPLEY, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for attempted murder, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102(l)(c)(I) (West Supp. 2009). The 
appeal was poured over to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court. This Court 
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting five photographs 
depicting the victim's injuries, where the photographs were compelling evidence 
that Defendant inflicted serious bodily injury on the victim with an intent to kill 
him? 
Standard of Review: The decision to admit the evidence required the lower 
court to evaluate the photographs' relevance, gruesomeness, and prejudicial 
versus probative value. See State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f t 18,57,52 R3d 1210 
(citations omitted). A trial court's determination of a photograph's relevance and 
admissibility under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, is reviewed for abuse 
discretion. See id. at f 18. The determination of whether photographs are 
gruesome is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rules 401 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, are set forth in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with attempted murder with injury, a first degree felony, 
based on an attack on a seventeen-year-old juvenile. R. 1-2. Defendant waived a 
preliminary hearing and was bound over for trial. R. 18. 
On December 9, 2008, the State filed written notice that it intended to present 
expert testimony concerning the juggalo subculture and the victim's physical injuries.1 
R. 32-33. On January 8, 2009, defense counsel responded with a motion in limine 
seeking to exclude, among other things, photographs depicting "wounds inflicted by an 
ax [sic] on the back neck and front neck and left shoulder of the victim." R. 41-43; R. 
^'Juggalos" is the name given the followers of a certain music group 
under the Psychopathic Records label. R. 32, 56-59. 
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176:18. At oral argument on the motion, defense counsel reiterated, "I just want the 
photographs that show the cut in the neck and the gaping wound on the . . . left shoulder, 
and the gaping wound on the back of the victim's neck excluded. Those are the two 
photographs that I want excluded, because they are gruesome." R. 176:18. The trial 
judge ruled the photographs admissible because they were "very graphic and very 
sobering, but not gruesome" and because "their probative value [was] extremely high." 
R. 176:27. The judge also permitted use of photographs showing knife wounds. R. 
176:28. However, the judge ordered the prosecution to "minimize" any duplicative 
photographs. R. 176:27-28. Defense counsel thereafter sought to ask the jury pool a 
question concerning pictures of graphic injuries from a battle axe, but the judge rejected 
the question in light of her own questioning of the pool concerning both the axe and the 
photographs and in light of her previous ruling. R. 172:68-69. 
When the State began to question the medical expert at trial about the five 
photographs it had chosen to use, Defendant registered "the same objection" to the 
proffered pictures that he had "previously" raised. R. 171:19. At no time did Defendant 
seek to expand his objection beyond the scope originally presented to the trial court: 
photographs of "wounds inflicted by an ax [sic] on the back neck and front neck and left 
shoulder of the victim." R. 42; R. 171:19; R. 176:18. And at no time before or during 
trial did Defendant object to the use of photographs depicting the victim's knife wounds. 
See, e.g., R. 171:19 (presentation of photos to medical expert); R. 172: 67-69 (discussion 
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of preserving objections to photographs); R. 176:27-28 (discussion of knife photos). Nor 
was there an objection raised at trial to any duplicative photographs of Justin's injuries.2 
R. 171:19; R. 172:68-69. 
The jury was instructed to consider not only the charge of attempted murder, but 
also aggravated assault with serious bodily injury and aggravated assault with a 
dangerous weapon. R. 134. Following a two-day trial, the jury convicted Defendant of 
attempted murder, and the court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of three years to 
life in prison. R. 112-13, 146-48, 150. Defendant timely appealed to the Utah Supreme 
Court, which transferred the appeal to this Court. R. 152, 162-63. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Motivation 
During the night of July 28, 2008, Defendant and his good friend Cody Augustine 
were drinking at the home of a mutual friend, Michaela Gill, when Augustine told Gill 
that he believed he may have contracted a venereal disease from Stacey. R. 171:75-78; 
Defendant's Exh. 3:16. Augustine thought Stacey had contracted it from her ex-
boyfriend. Id. Augustine told Gill, "I swear to God if I have an STD, I am going to kill 
2Defendant did not object to the admission of State's Exhibits 16 through 
34, which depict blood splatters, smears and pools of blood at the site of the 
attack, one of which also showed a clump of hair. R.171: 40-46. Neither did he 
object to the admission of the battle axe into evidence. R. 172:141. 
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him[,]" to which Defendant responded, "I got toys." R. 171: 77-78. Gill testified that she 
thought Augustine was referring to his girlfriend's ex-boyfriend, Justin. R. 171: 78-79. 
"He was covered in blood" 
Kathleen Ennis was awakened by the screams of her seventeen-year-old son Justin 
in the early morning hours of July 29, 2008. R. 172: 81-82. Kathleen's husband helped 
Justin into the house. "[Justin] had his shirt pushed up against the back of his neck and 
he was covered in blood. ... [H]e was frantic. ... He said he'd been attacked with a knife 
and ... an axe or a hatchet." R. 172: 82-83. The couple put their son in the bathtub and 
called 911. R. 172:83. In the process, Justin left a "pathway of blood" on the floors and 
the walls between where he entered the house and the bathroom, including "a large 
puddle of blood on the hallway where he stood[.]" R. 172: 83. Deputy Afatasi, a Salt 
Lake County Sheriffs deputy, testified that when he arrived on the scene, "blood was 
everywhere." R. 172: 125. 
Justin was unarmed when he went outside between 4:15 and 4:30 a.m. to meet 
Stacey, an old friend whom he thought he had been texting. R. 172: 90-99, 110-11. 
However, Justin had unknowingly been exchanging texts with Augustine. R. 171:88-89; 
State's Exh. 5; Defendant's Exh. 3. Augustine posed as Stacey to lure Justin outside 
where Augustine and Defendant waited in Defendant's car. R. 171:88-89; 172: 99-100. 
When "Stacey" texted that "she" was there, Justin went outside to see "her." R. 172:95-
5 
98. His father's large truck was at the curb in front of his house. R. 172:99-101; State's 
Exhs. 2 & 3 . 
While Justin waited in his front yard, Defendant prodded Augustine, saying it's 
"now or never. If you are going to go, go. I'll be right behind you." R. 171:89-90. 
Defendant planned to follow Justin with a four-bladed battle axe he kept in a box in the 
back seat of his car, choosing the axe over a table leg that was in the same box at the 
time. R. 171:84-86. 
Justin heard a car door shut, heard someone running around the truck, and turned 
to see Augustine running at him, wielding a knife. R. 172: 101-02. Justin ran the other 
way around the truck and into the middle of the street where Defendant was waiting for 
him. R. 172: 102. Defendant "had an axe in his hand," "came around from behind[,]" 
and "hit [Justin] in the back of the neck"with it. R. 172: 103; Defendant's Exh. 3:11. 
Justin continued to struggle with both attackers, and Defendant was knocked into a 
fence, losing his necklace in the process. R. 171:92; R. 172:103-04. Justin broke free of 
Augustine and ran toward his house. R. 171:91-93; R. 172:104. As he passed 
Defendant, Defendant again hit him across the front of his neck and his left shoulder 
with the axe. R. 171:20, 25, 104. Justin fled up his driveway, and Augustine followed 
him. R. 171:104; R. 172:104. Defendant heard yelling and screaming from Justin, 
hesitated, and then screamed at Augustine that they needed to "bail." R. 171:93-94. 
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Augustine returned to the front yard covered "from head to toe in blood[.]" R. 171:94, 
114. The two ran to Defendant's car and left. R. 171:94-95. 
The Arrest 
Defendant dropped Augustine off at his house, stopped briefly at his own house, 
then went to the home of a friend and fellow weapons afficionado, Chris Bird. R. 
171:71-72, 95-96. Defendant took the axe with him. R. 171:95-96. It wasn't until later 
that Defendant noticed his necklace was missing. R. 172:97. He drove Bird back to 
Justin's house to see if they could find it. R. 172:97-98. They found the police instead. 
Id 
Deputy Afatasi was at the scene for a second time after having followed the 
ambulance to the hospital and spoken to Justin before his surgery. R. 172:125-27. 
Defendant's tan Nissan caught the deputy's attention, not only because it was the same 
make and model initially reported by the victim as having been involved in the attack, 
but also because the emblem on the back window of the car matched the emblem on the 
necklace the police had found earlier next to a chain link fence in Justin's front yard. R. 
172:126-28. The emblem was the profile of a male running with a meat cleaver in one 
hand.3 R. 56, 66. 
When the deputy stopped the Nissan, he found Defendant behind the wheel and 
Bird in the passenger seat. R. 172:129-30. Defendant explained that they were "just 
3The emblem is called a "Hatchetman" and is the logo for Psychopathic 
Records. R. 56-57. 
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driving around . . . trying to kill some time." R. 172:131. Deputy Afatasi testified that 
Defendant "seemed a little bit nervous," but did not appear to be intoxicated. R. 172:129, 
135. The officer ran the information concerning the license, registration, and insurance, 
then returned to the Nissan. R. 172:130-31. He pulled Defendant from the car and 
walked with him back to the police car as he explained that Defendant was a suspect in 
the earlier attack. R. 172:131. It was at this point that the officer noticed dried blood 
stains on Defendant's face. Id, The officer read Defendant his rights, then remarked 
about the blood stains, prompting an admission from Defendant that he had been 
involved in the attack. R. 172:131-32. 
During the subsequent interrogation, the Defendant was asked if he believed 
hitting someone with the axe could result in death, and he replied, "I would be lying if I 
said I didn't think it might, but I never really thought about it; I was just there to back up 
my friend." R. 171: 49. In his written statement, Defendant admitted that he "hit [Justin] 
in the right shoulder" with the axe then "got him one more time in the left shoulder[.]" R. 
171:104. 
A few days later, Defendant made a phone call from the jail to friends, in which 
he described himself as a "soldier" and made light of the attack. R. 171: 61-62; State's 
Exh. 15. During the phone call, which was played to the jury, Defendant acknowledged 
that he and Augustine had lured Justin outside; he described how he swung the axe, how 
it hit Justin, and how he blocked Justin's escape by getting between the victim and his 
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house. R. 171:61-62; State's Exh. 15. When one friend described the extent of Justin's 
injuries during the call, Defendant showed no remorse, but simply expressed surprise that 
Justin had survived the attack. R. 171:110, 113. 
Justin 9s Injuries 
Doctors told Justin he had been struck a total of twelve times, suffering wounds 
consistent with an axe and a knife. R. 171:23-26, 27-29; R. 172: 106. At trial, Justin 
was still suffering pain in his left shoulder and had scars on his throat, neck, shoulder, rib 
cage, hand, fingers, back, head, and chin. R. 172: 106-07; Defendant's Exh. 1. 
As stated, the State chose five photographs to introduce at trial to show some of 
Justin's injuries. The State offered the photographs during the testimony of Dr. Thomas 
White, the doctor who treated Justin in the emergency room. R. 171: 18-19; State's 
Exhibits 10 through 14.4 Dr. White remembered that Justin was "awake and alert[,]" but 
also "clearly badly injured," with "multiple sites of bleeding." R. 171: 19. After defense 
counsel renewed "the same objection" he had previously made to the photographs, Dr. 
White described the injuries shown in the State's exhibits, which he characterized as fair 
and accurate depictions of some of Justin's wounds just before he went into surgery. R. 
171: 19-21. Dr. White testified, "the nature of the large laceration across the back of the 
neck right about the hair line, and a second wound that is about that far away, running 
4The State declines to attach the challenged photographs to its brief out of 
concern for the victim's privacy. They may be seen in the appellate record and 
in Addendum D of Appellant's brief. 
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parallel, suggest to me, . . . two blades striking . . . the [victim] simultaneously . . . . And 
that's consistent with this instrument that I see [the axe]." R. 171: 24. He also noted that 
the wounds across the front of Justin's shoulder and neck appeared to be created from the 
same weapon that created the wound on the back of his neck, given the curvature of the 
wounds and the fact that they were "very, very similar" in length and depth. R. 171:25. 
He explained that the wounds were "more consistent with a chop" than a "slicing" 
motion, and that they were not life threatening, although they had come "very close" to 
being critical. R. 171: 26-27, 29. The strike on the back of the neck came "within a few 
centimeters of the spinal cord[,]" the wound on the front of the neck was "within a few 
centimeters" of the jugular vein and carotid artery, and the wounds narrowly missed 
Justin's windpipe. R. 171:30-31. 
At trial, Defendant admitted his involvement in the attack, but claimed that he did 
not intend to kill Justin; rather, he merely sought to support his friend Augustine. R. 
171:49, 100-02. Defendant testified that he swung the axe at Justin the first time as a 
reflex because "he was coming right at me[.]" R. 171:90. The second wound was 
inflicted when Justin ran into the axe as he tried to pass Defendant to escape Augustine. 
R. 171:91-92. Defendant also argued that the axe wounds did not constitute serious 
bodily injury. R. 171:130-32. The jury rejected the defense theory. R. 148. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant attacks the admission of five photographs on appeal. However, he 
objected below to only the photographs showing the wounds on either side of the victim's 
neck that were inflicted by the four-bladed battle axe (State's Exh. 11, 12, 13). His 
failure to object to any other photographs or to present a plain error or exceptional 
circumstance argument on appeal prevents appellate review of the other photographs he 
seeks to challenge on appeal. 
The photographs are relevant and highly probative of contested issues central to 
the trial. The location and severity of the wounds demonstrate the intent with which the 
blows were inflicted, whether the second blow was accidental, and whether the blows 
resulted in substantial bodily injury. The photographs permitted the jury to accurately 
compare the physical evidence, the circumstances of the attack, and the parties' versions 
of the events. The fact that the wounds could have been addressed through testimonial 
evidence does not render the photographs irrelevant. 
Although the pictures of the axe wounds are graphic and sobering, they are not 
gruesome. They show the sort of damage a battle axe can do to the human body. 
Enlarged and in color, they were taken at the hospital before surgery, not at the bloody 
crime scene, and are cropped to focus only on the non-fatal wounds, without unnecessary 
posing or unnatural contortion. They accurately depict the unadorned results of 
Defendant's part in the attack on the victim. 
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Any prejudice from the photographs was not unfair where they demonstrated the 
natural, unenhanced result of the charged conduct admittedly inflicted by Defendant. 
Given the unusually high probative value of the photographs to the hotly contested issues 
of intent and degree of injury, the trial court properly determined that the probative value 
was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Should this Court 
find the photographs to be gruesome, their unusually high probative value substantially 
outweighs the low risk of unfair prejudice, justifying their use at trial. 
Even assuming error in admitting the photographs depicting the axe wounds, the 
error would be harmless in light of the remaining evidence. That evidence includes: the 
fact that Defendant chose to use the axe instead of a less lethal weapon, urged his co-
defendant into action, admitted to officers that he hit the victim twice, landed blows with 
the axe on the front and the back of the victim's neck, and showed no remorse over his 
conduct when talking to friends from jail a week later. The jurors would also have seen 
the photographs of the knife wounds demonstrating the severity of the attack and 
illustrating some of the medical expert's testimony. They would also have examined the 
axe used by Defendant, permitting further consideration of the intent behind his conduct. 
Finally, if the photographs had not been admitted, the State would likely have used more 
detailed descriptions and drawings of the wounds in support of the testimony concerning 
the location and severity of the wounds, as suggested by Defendant. In light of this 
12 
evidence, a more favorable outcome for Defendant is not reasonably likely, even absent 
the photographs of the axe wounds. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ADMITTING PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE AXE WOUNDS, WHERE 
THOSE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE COMPELLING EVIDENCE 
THAT DEFENDANT INFLICTED SERIOUS BODILY INJURY ON 
THE VICTIM WITH THE INTENT TO KILL HIM 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting five 
photographs illustrating some of the victim's numerous injuries. See Aplt. Br. at 10-24. 
He argues that: (1) none of the photographs is relevant to any contested issue; (2) all of 
the photographs are legally gruesome; (3) all of the photographs fail the balancing 
analysis under rule 403 because they are significantly more prejudicial than probative; 
and (4) their admission was prejudicial because they aroused such a sense of horror that it 
resulted in his conviction for the highest possible charge. See id. Defendant's claims fail 
because the record supports the trial court's conclusion that the photographs were highly 
relevant to the element of intent, were "very sobering[,]]" but not gruesome, and carried 
an "extremely high" probative value that was "not substantially outweighed by [the risk 
of] unfair prejudice." R. 176:27. 
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A. The Challenged Photographs 
Defendant challenges five color photographs, all of which are 8 x 10 inches in size 
and all of which were taken in the hospital immediately before surgery. See Aplt. Br. at 
Addendum D (State's Exhibits 10-14). 
State's Exhibit 10 is a close up of a puncture wound or laceration made by a knife 
on the upper left side of the victim's back and a second similar wound higher up on the 
left shoulder. R. 171:19-20; State's Exh. 10. Fresh blood appears near the wounds, and 
dried blood is present on the remainder of the skin. State's Exh. 10. 
Knife wounds also appear in State's Exhibit 14, which shows a close up of the 
victim's hands across his abdomen. R. 171:21; State's Exh. 14. In the center of the 
picture is "an obvious fresh wound" across the inside of the victim's right hand between 
the thumb and the forefinger. R. 171:21; State's Exh. 14. A heart monitor is clipped to 
one finger, and there is dried blood on the hands and on the abdomen beneath them. 
State's Exh. 14. 
State's Exhibit 11 shows the victim's shoulders and the back of his neck as he is 
lying face down. R. 171:20; State's Exh. 11. The victim's hair is matted with blood. 
Fresh and dried blood appear on the back of his neck and his shoulders, an open axe 
wound runs from one side of his neck across the back of the neck to the other side, and a 
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second, smaller axe wound is visible on the upper left side of his back.5 R. 171:20; 
State's Exh. 11. 
State's Exhibit 12 shows the victim's upper body and head from his left side as he 
is lying on his back. R. 171:20; State's Exh. 12. There is an open axe wound across the 
victim's left shoulder and the suggestion of a second wound on the front of his neck. R. 
171:20. There is fresh blood near both wounds, and dried blood over the victim's torso, 
face, and neck. State's Exh. 12. A breathing tube protrudes from the victim's mouth, a 
gloved hand rests behind his head holding an additional tube and a wad of gauze, and the 
bedding beneath the hand is largely covered with blood. Id. 
State's Exhibit 13 shows the victim's upper chest from the front as he is lying on 
his back. R. 171:20; State's Exh. 13. The photo was taken slightly closer to the wounds 
than Exhibit 12 and shows a different view of the axe wound across the victim's upper 
left shoulder. State's Exh. 13. In addition, it shows the entire second wound up the front 
of the victim's neck. Id. The dried blood around both wounds has been cleaned, the 
breathing tube is still in the victim's mouth, and the bedding beneath the victim's head is 
free of blood. Id. 
5Defendant contends that Exhibit 11 also shows a "deep puncture wound 
on the back of the left shoulder[.]" Aplt Br. at 17. That description does not 
appear in Dr. White's testimony, and the wound is not apparent to State's 
counsel on appeal. 
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B. Defendant Waived Appellate Review of Two of his Claims 
Defendant raises two arguments which are not properly before this Court. First, 
he argues that admission of Exhibits 12 and 13, which show axe wounds, violated the 
lower court's order prohibiting the State from using photographs duplicative of the 
victim's wounds. See Aplt. Br. at 16. However, Defendant made no such objection 
below. See R. 41-43; R. 171:19; R. 176: passim. Second, Defendant contends that 
Exhibits 10, 14, and 11 (in part) were not relevant because they showed wounds inflicted 
by his co-defendant's knife, which attack was not at issue in Defendant's trial. See Aplt. 
Br. at 17. Again, he made no such objection in the trial court. See R. 41-43; R. 171:19; 
R. 176: passim. Instead, his objections were directed only at "[pictures of wounds 
inflicted by an ax on the back neck and front neck and left shoulder of the victim. " R. 
42-43; R. 176: 18. He makes no claim of plain error or exceptional circumstances for 
either unpreserved argument on appeal. Aplt. Br. at 10-24. Absent a timely and proper 
objection below or a claim of either plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal, 
Defendant has waived appellate review of both arguments. See State v. King, 2006 UT 
3, \ 13, 131 P.3d 202 (a defendant who fails to preserve an objection at trial waives 
appellate review of the objection absent plain error or exceptional circumstances); State 
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 10 P.3d 346 (same). Consequently, this Court need 
only review the photographs of the axe wounds—Exhibits 11, 12, and 13. 
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C. Utah's Three-Part Test for Admitting Allegedly Gruesome Photographs 
In Utah, the admissibility of the three allegedly gruesome photographs turns on 
application of a three-part test: 
1) are the photographs relevant; 
2) are the photographs gruesome; and 
3) do the photographs pass the appropriate balancing test for probative and 
prejudicial value under rule 403. 
State v. Barber, 2009 UT App 91, \ SI, 206 P.3d 1223 (citing State v. Gulbransen, 2005 
UT 7, f^ 34, 106 P.3d 734). Because "some categories of evidence, including gruesome 
photographs," are considered "inherently prejudicial[,]" they warrant a different balancing 
analysis under the third part of the test. State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 87, \ 34, 57 P.3d 220 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
If the photograph is gruesome, it should not be admitted unless the State can 
show that the probative value of the photograph substantially outweighs the 
risk of unfair prejudice. If the photograph is not gruesome, it should be 
admitted unless the defendant can show that the risk of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs the probative value of the photograph. 
Barber, 2009 UT App 91, If 57 (quoting Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, f 34). See also State v. 
Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ffif 45-46, 52 P.3d 1210. 
D. The Challenged Evidence Meets Utah's Three-Pronged Test 
1. Relevance. The threshold question in determining whether an allegedly 
gruesome photograph is admissible is relevance. See Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ^ 34. 
Defendant contends that photographs of the axe wounds are irrelevant because they 
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establish only that the victim was hit twice with an axe. See Aplt. Br. at 16. In light of 
his admission that he was involved in the assault on the victim and that the axe struck the 
victim twice, he argues, Exhibits 11, 12, and 13 were "superfluous and irrelevant" 
because they simply "'corroborate^] uncontested facts.9" Id. at 15-16 (quoting 
Calliham, 2002 UT 87, ^  40). He also argues that the photographs "were unnecessary" 
because they were duplicative of live witness testimony describing the victim's injuries. 
See id. at 16-17. 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. Color photographs of a victim's 
body "are not inadmissible if they are probative of essential facts, even though [the 
photographs] may be cumulative of other evidence." State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 63 
(Utah 1983). The mere fact that a photograph may demonstrate some uncontested or 
stipulated matter does not render it less relevant or provide a basis for depriving the State 
of the opportunity to profit from the '"legitimate moral force'" of the photograph's 
evidence. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ^ 37 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 475 
(Utah 1988)) (additional quotation omitted). Neither is a photograph rendered 
inadmissible merely because the information it conveys could be established by other 
means. See id. at *f 38 (medical witness' in-depth testimony about injuries shown in 
challenged photographs did not detract from photographs' admissibility where they were 
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relevant to establish essential element of sodomy charges); Bluff, 2002 UT 66, <[f 48 
(autopsy photographs of child victim relevant despite witness' testimonial description of 
the wounds to show mother had knowledge of abuse). 
In this case, the photographs were not admitted merely to establish the fact or 
location of the victim's wounds or some other uncontested issue. Neither were they 
merely cumulative of testimonial descriptions of the wounds. Rather, their relevance lay 
in their relationship to two contested issues: (1) the intent with which the wounds were 
inflicted, and (2) the existence of serious bodily injury. See State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 611, 
615 (Utah App 1998) (noting that while testimony could establish location of wounds, 
challenged photographs were relevant to show extent of wounds and whether wounds 
were intentionally or accidentally inflicted). Both issues were central to this case. 
Defendant faced the possibility of being convicted of assault with a dangerous 
weapon, assault causing serious bodily injury, or attempted murder. See R. 134. To 
obtain an attempted murder conviction, the State was required to establish that Defendant 
acted with the intent to kill the victim. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102(l)(c)(i) (West 
Supp. 2009). The trial court noted that the photographs were "highly probative" of that 
element, i.e., establishing whether "this was an attempt at a person's life as opposed to an 
assault." Order on Defendant's Motions in Limine at 6 (attached in Addendum C); R. 
176:16. 
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Both parties alerted the jury in their opening remarks to the importance of evidence 
relating to Defendant's intent or "his conscious objective" for participating in the attack. 
R. 172:74, 77-79. Throughout the trial, Defendant admitted his involvement in the 
assault, but maintained that his conduct was inconsistent with an intent to kill the victim. 
R. 171: 128-38. He also acknowledged that he willingly went to the victim's house and 
struck the victim with an axe5 but contended that he did not take part in the assault with 
the intent to kill the victim. See Aplt. Br. at 14-17, 23; R. 171:69, 99, 89-92, 103-05, 91, 
92; R. 172:131. Instead, he claimed, "He intended to provide back-up for Cody[,]" and 
swung the axe at the victim once as a reflex and again because he was knocked off 
balance and the victim ran into the axe. See Aplt. Br. at 23; R. 171:88-92, 101-05. Both 
parties thereafter offered the jury their version of Defendant's intent in their closing 
arguments. R. 171:126-28, 132-38. 
The challenged photographs are relevant to the jury's consideration of the intent 
issue because they accurately portray both the location and the severity of the wounds. 
See R. 176:16-17. The wounds did not, in fact, kill the victim in this case. However, 
their severity and the fact that they were inflicted on the front and the back of the victim's 
neck speaks volumes about whether they were intended to kill him. The photographs 
enabled the jury to see how the physical evidence and the circumstances of the attack 
compared to Defendant's version of events and made Defendant's claimed lack of intent 
less probable than it would have been without the evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 401; see 
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also Dean v. State, 746 So.2d 891, 893-94 (Miss. App. 1998) (photos showing the 
severity of the victim's wounds relevant to defendant's claim of self-defense); State v. 
Middleton, 611 P.2d 698, 701-02 (Or. App. 1980) (photos of knife wounds demonstrated 
"force of the knife thrusts" and, hence, could rebut claim of self-defense). 
Moreover, Dr. White's testimony concerning the similarity of the depth and length 
of the wounds reasonably suggests not only that they were inflicted by the same weapon, 
but that they occurred through the use of the same amount of force. R. 171:25. The 
photographs allow the jury to accurately assess the similarity of the wounds in 
considering Defendant's claim that the second blow was an accident. 
Defendant similarly argued below that he should be acquitted of aggravated assault 
with serious bodily injury because no serious bodily injury occurred. R. 171:130-32. The 
photographs were exceedingly relevant to this issue because they demonstrated the 
precise injuries at issue, again permitting the jury to better assess Defendant's claim. 
Finally, the State's ability to establish the details of the attack through means other 
than photographs does not render the photographs irrelevant or inadmissible. See, e.g., 
Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, |^ 38 ("We have held that the fact that the same evidence could 
have been provided by purely testimonial means does not necessarily make a photograph 
inadmissible.") (quotations and citation omitted); Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f 48-49 (autopsy 
photographs of child victim relevant to show mother had knowledge of abuse, despite 
witness' testimonial description of the wounds). It is easy to see why Defendant would 
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prefer any other presentation of the wounds. He is not entitled, however, to the least 
graphic means available. 
Where the challenged photographs accurately depicted the non-fatal but serious 
results of the attack on the victim, demonstrating the force of the blows and the location 
and severity of the wounds, they were essential to the jury's assessment of both the intent 
behind the blows and the existence of serious bodily injury. Hence, they were highly 
relevant to contested issues at the trial. See Betha, 957 P.2d at 615 (despite medical 
testimony concerning victim's wounds, photographs of non-fatal injuries "highly 
relevant" to contested issues of intent and consent); State v. Jiron, 882 P.2d 685, 890-91 
(Utah App. 1994) (photograph of non-fatal injury probative of whether wounds resulted 
from violent act or accident and whether wounds inflicted with intent to kill). Where 
Defendant admitted his part in administering the wounds depicted in the photographs and 
the issue centered on the intent behind his conduct, this Court should be loathe to deprive 
the jury of the most readily available and relevant evidence of his intent: the accurate 
depiction of the visible results of his actions. 
2. Gruesomeness. Whether a photograph is gruesome depends on several factors, 
including: 
-whether the photograph is in color; 
-whether it is a close-up or an enlargement; 
-when it was taken in relation to the crime, including whether it shows the victim 
as found at the crime scene; and 
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-whether details in the photograph aside from the victim "' exacerbate the 
photograph's impact on the viewer.'" 
Barber, 2009 UT App 91, If 60 (quoting Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, % 39) (additional 
quotation omitted). These factors are neither exclusive nor necessarily determinative. 
See id. The photograph may well be deemed not to be gruesome despite the presence of 
several of these factors. See, e.g., Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ^  51 (four color autopsy 
photographs of young victim showing bruising and lacerations and containing extraneous 
objects deemed unpleasant but not gruesome); State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ^[ 53, 56, 20 
P.3d 271 (challenged photographs not gruesome even though "[e]ach of the first three 
factors [was] met"); Barber, 2009 UT App 91, f^ 63 (pictures which included close-up, 
enlarged, color images showing extraneous medical devices deemed "disturbing but not 
gruesome"). The factors merely assist in reaching the ultimate decision concerning 
whether the photograph "'has a tendency to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the 
jury.'" Barber, 2009 UT App 91,1j 60 (quoting Calliham, 2002 UT 87, t 39) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Defendant contends that all five photographs are gruesome because they: 
-are in color; 
-are close-ups of injuries that include "gaping laceration[s]" and deep 
wounds; 
-include injuries inflicted by someone other than Defendant; and 
-show fresh and dried blood and exposed tissue. 
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SeeAplt. Br. at 18-19. 
In this case, the trial court determined that while the challenged photographs were 
"graphic and soberingf,]" they were not g[ruesome.]" Add. B at 6. The judge explained 
that two of the four general factors applied: the photographs were in color and were 
enlargements. Id. On the other hand, he noted, they were not taken at the bloody crime 
scene but in the clinical setting of a hospital, and they included nothing extraneous to the 
victim himself that would exacerbate the photographs' impact. See id. 
The trial judge's evaluation of the challenged photographs was accurate. While 
the trial court acknowledged that the wounds were "extremely troubling ... to view[,]" 
nothing in the photographs suggested that the wounds were presented in a manner 
calculated to add unnecessary shock value or unfair revulsion. R. 176:16. There is no 
doubt that the photographs are "graphic and sobering"—they depict the damage resulting 
from use of a four-bladed battle axe on a human body. Id. That does not, however, 
render them gruesome for purposes of admission at trial. See Barber, 2009 UT App 91, | 
64 (photographs "graphic and sobering" and "disturbing but not gruesome"). Neither 
does the fact that they are enlarged and in color render them legally gruesome. See Bluff, 
2002 UT 66, If 49 (enlarged, color autopsy photographs not gruesome because they "show 
cleaned wounds, and little if any blood,.. . [and] do not unfairly characterize [the 
victim's] bruising, her condition, or her injuries"); Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ^ 54 (color 
enlargement of autopsy photographs of victim's shaved head showing wounds from 
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multiple strikes to the head and fractured skull after skin had been pulled back, not 
gruesome). 
The photographs are enlarged, but were taken in a sanitized setting away from the 
scene of the bloody attack. They are also cropped to exclude extraneous matters and to 
focus on particular wounds without unnecessary distractions or duplications. See Bluff, 
2002 UT 66, \ 50 (discounting presence of extraneous objects & approving focus on 
wounds). The presence of things like a breathing tube and IV lines are common on 
hospital patients and are not unexpected or unnecessarily inflammatory in light of the 
victim's severe injuries. See id. at ^[51; Barber, 2009 UT App 91, \ 63. The tubes do not 
appear to enter or exit the victim's body in any particular manner and are not otherwise 
repugnant. Hence, they are unlikely to unfairly inflame a jury. Barber, 2009 UT App 91, 
Tf63 (discounting presence of extraneous tubing where it was "far less shocking" than 
severe injuries at issue). 
As Defendant correctly notes, the disturbing nature of the photographs is due to the 
very thing that makes them probative-the wounds themselves. See Aplt. Br. at 18-19. 
Exhibits 11-13 show deep wounds that include exposed tissue and blood. The visual 
depictions of the depth and severity of the wounds, however, is a function of the injuries 
themselves, not of any posing or unnatural contortion to highlight the wounds. The 
pictures present a fair characterization of the injuries inflicted by one side of a four-
bladed axe. The extent of the damage is readily apparent in the photographs, is presented 
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without unnecessary detail designed to exacerbate the photographs' impact on the viewer, 
and is entirely appropriate to the jury's consideration of the issue for which the 
photographs were admitted: the intent behind the attack. See Barber, 2009 UT App 91, 
n 60-61. 
The inclusion of the visual depictions of the knife wounds caused by the co-
defendant does not distort the impact of the injuries inflicted by Defendant. See Aplt. Br. 
at 18. The co-defendant's use of the knife to inflict severe injuries at the same time as 
Defendant's use of the axe bears directly on the intent behind the attack. Further, the 
impact of the knife wounds is modest compared to that of the axe wounds, and the 
photographs are unembellished and close-cropped to exclude unnecessary matters. They 
merely display the injuries without amplification and complete the picture of the attack to 
better enable the jury to assess the relevant intent in light of the parties' arguments. 
Finally, the presence of blood does not elevate the photographs to gruesomeness. 
Instead, its impact is significantly less than that of the wounds themselves. Given the 
nature of the wounds, there is surprisingly little blood in the photographs and 
considerably less in the hospital setting than there would have been at the scene of the 
attack. Much of the blood is dried, and one photograph was taken after the blood had 
been largely cleaned. See Exhibit 13. Yet the impact of the wounds remains strong. 
While the presence of blood may be an unpleasant detail for the jurors, that fact is entirely 
due to the inflicted injuries. The photographs impact was lessened by the victim's 
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removal from the bloody crime scene before the pictures were taken, and its presence 
does not distort the injuries or unfairly shock or inflame the jury. See, e.g., Bluff, 2002 
UT 66, Tflf 49-51 (unpleasant details in photographs "primarily due to the injuries inflicted 
on [the victim]" did not tend to unfairly characterize victim's condition or injuries, did not 
render the photographs gruesome). 
Again, all the elements Defendant highlights, though "unpleasant," are directly 
"due to the injuries inflicted on [the victim]." Id. at ^ f 51. Thus, "[o]ther than 
demarcating the [severity of the types] of injuries [the victim] received, there is nothing 
inflammatory about the photographs." Vargas, 2001 UT 5, f 56. Where the photographs 
present an accurate, unadorned view of the injuries Defendant admitted inflicting on the 
victim, where nothing extraneous to the wounds suggests any dramatic 
mischaracterization of the injuries, and where the graphic and sobering impact of the 
photographs arises almost entirely from the wounds themselves, the photographs are not 
gruesome. See Betha, 957 P.2d at 615 ("bloody and graphic" photographs taken after a 
rape victim's wounds cleaned were not gruesome because "[n]one of the photos 
exaggerate the nature of [the victim's] injuries or reveal those injuries in an unduly 
offensive manner."); see also Calliham, 2002 UT 87, j^ 39, 57 P.3d 220 (color 
photographs of murder victim showing his face, bullet wounds, and dried blood were not 
gruesome). 
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3. Analysis under Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. If a photograph is not 
gruesome, it is admitted unless Defendant can show that the risk of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs the probative value of the photograph. See Barber, 2009 UT App 
91, f 57 (quoting Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, *| 34). However, if a photograph is deemed to 
be legally gruesome, the burden shifts to the State to "show that the probative value of 
such evidence substantially outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice." Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f^ 
45. 
Because the trial judge properly determined that the photographs were not 
gruesome (see subpoint 2, supra), she correctly applied the balancing analysis under rule 
403, Utah Rules of Evidence. See id, at Tftj 44, 52. However, even assuming that the 
photographs were gruesome and the burden shifted to the State, the result is the same. 
Defendant argues that the photographs fail under either analysis. See Aplt. Br. at 
19-22. He contends that the photographs "added only shock value" to the trial because 
the State had several other means by which "to describe injuries that were not life 
threatening." Id. at 19-20. He points to the testimony from the victim and his doctor, the 
scars visible on the victim's body, and the State's ability to have witnesses diagram the 
injuries or provide additional testimony concerning their observations of the wounds. See 
id. These "alternative methods" for establishing the wounds, he argues, together with 
Defendant's acknowledgment of his part in the attack, left the photographs with "scant" 
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probative value that was outweighed by their "unusually prejudicial" emotional impact. 
M a t 20-21. 
The trial court determined that the photographs had "extremely high" probative 
value which "substantially outweighed" any risk of unfair prejudice. R. 176:27. Given 
the charges in this case and the defense claims that Defendant did not intend to kill the 
victim and that the wounds did not amount to serious bodily injury, the photographs 
possessed "unusual probative value." Bluff 2002 UT 66, ^ f 53; see subpoint 1, supra. To 
establish attempted murder, the State had to prove that Defendant "intentionally or 
knowingly" attempted to "cause the death of another[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-
102(l)(c)(I) (West Supp. 2009); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008). 
To establish aggravated assault with serious bodily injury, the State had to prove, in part, 
that Defendant "intentionally cause[d] serious bodily injury to another[.]" Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(a) (West 2004). 
The challenged photographs were exceedingly useful in demonstrating these 
elements. See Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ^} 40-41 (finding nongruesome photographs 
"useful in depicting evidence of crucial elements of the State's charged offenses."). 
Defendant's claim that he lacked the intent to kill Justin and that he injured him 
accidently and only out of "reflex" and created a situation where the photographs were 
highly probative of the State's contention that the injuries were not accidental, but 
intentional and with the intent to kill. See subpoint 1, supra; see also Calliham, 2002 UT 
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87, ^ 40 ("disturbing" photos admissible where they went to issue "of great importance in 
the case"); Bluff, 2002 UT 66, If 53. 
Defendant similarly insisted that the case did not involve "serious bodily injuryf,]" 
"damage to a bodily organ[,]" or "permanent serious disfigurement." R. 171:130-31. 
Because the photographs revealed the extent of the injuries admittedly caused by 
Defendant and their precise location, they were also highly probative of the crucial 
element of serious bodily injury. 
The disturbing nature of the photographs did not give rise to a heightened 
possibility of unfair prejudice outweighing the photographs' high probative value. Any 
prejudice arising from the photographs was not unfair because it derived from the simple 
presentation of the natural, unadulterated result of conduct Defendant admitted 
committing. See Woods v. Zeluff 2007 UT App 84, \1, 158 P.3d 552 (even "highly 
prejudicial" testimony may be admissible; it is not the existence of prejudice but the 
danger of unfair prejudice that determines admissibility). Even the amount of blood in 
the photographs was understandable and did not render them unfairly prejudicial given 
the extent and gravity of the victim's injuries. Cf Calliham, 2002 UT 87, ^ | 39 (upholding 
admission of victim's gunshot wounds "visible as dark dots in the body" with "a small 
amount of dark, dried blood near some of the wounds" where "photos do not show a great 
deal of blood"). The photographs were "essential in helping the jury resolve" questions at 
issue beyond the simple fact of Defendant's involvement, and the fact that his weapon of 
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choice inflicted disturbing wounds is a matter of unavoidable fact, not unfair prejudice. 
Betha, 957 P.2d at 614-16. 
As stated, Defendant is also incorrect when he argues that the photographs were 
unduly prejudicial because the State could have established the existence of the injuries 
through other sources. See Aplt. Br. at 20. "Despite [defendant's] arguments to the 
contrary, bloody clothing and photographs of the victim are not excluded under rule 403 
simply because the State could have established the same facts through other evidence." 
State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, \ 54, 993 P.2d 837; accord Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, % 38 
("We have held that the fact that the same evidence could have been provided by purely 
testimonial means does not necessarily make a photograph inadmissible." (quotations and 
citation omitted)). Given the unusually high probative value of the photographs' 
depiction of the location and severity of the victim's injuries, and the relatively minimal 
risk of unfair prejudice, the trial court properly recognized that the photographs possessed 
"unusualf] probative value" that substantially outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice. R. 
176:23. See also Woods, 2007 UT App 84, ffif 6-9 ("highly prejudicial" testimony should 
have been admitted where, although it was prejudicial, it posed only "a slight risk of 
unfair prejudice") (emphasis in original). 
E. Any Error in Admitting the Photographs was Harmless 
Even if the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the photographs, any error 
was harmless. See, e.g., Calliham, 2002 UT 87, ffif 36-37 (recognizing application of 
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harmless error analysis to erroneous admission of allegedly gruesome photographs); State 
v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1989) (applying harmless error analysis to 
erroneous admission of gruesome videotape). An error warrants reversal only where 
there is a "reasonable likelihood" that, absent the photographs, "the results would have 
been more favorable to the defendant." Dibello, 780 P.2d at 1230. "This 'reasonable 
likelihood' standard is met if [the court's] confidence in the outcome is undermined." Id. 
Defendant argues that reversal is required because the remaining evidence would 
support a conviction for one of the alternative lesser offenses presented to the jury. See 
Aplt. Br. at 13-24. That does not, however, establish a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
would have convicted him of any of those offenses absent the photographs. Instead, the 
record establishes the opposite: that absent the photographs, there is no reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for Defendant. 
The jury knew that Defendant took part in the attack, that he used the axe on the 
victim, and that he told police, without qualification, that he "hit" the victim twice. The 
evidence suggested that despite the immediate availability of a table leg, Defendant 
consciously chose to use the four-bladed battle axe. R. 171:84-86. Despite Chris Bird's 
description of the axe as "a petty toy[,]" Defendant admitted that he knew it could kill or, 
as defense counsel put it, "cut you to pieces." R. 171: 49, 73, 85-86, 135. The axe was 
admitted into evidence, and the jury was fully able to evaluate its lethal nature. R. 114; R. 
172:141. 
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Dr. White explained that the axe wounds were located on the front and back of the 
victim's neck as well as on his shoulders. The fact that both the front and back wounds 
were n lade by the axe, A ei e l""";  / 21 y v ei y similar" in lengtl 1 and depth, ai id \ \ ei e 6 'more 
consistent with a chop" than a "slicing" motion reasonably sugge^ : -~ \: ': ;e\ :\ 
only purposely inflicted but were inflicted with the same degree of force and, hence, very 
likely the same intent. R, 171:25, That some degree of force was used is established by 
major organ, nothing suggests that was by skill or design. Indeed, the blows inflicted 
wounds that came :*\ er\ dose" to being critical. R. 171:26-27. The wounds came w ithin 
one or two centimeters of the victim's spinal cord, jugular vein, carotid artery, and 
trachea R 1.'" 1:30 31 I vv 0 of those - the spinal cord ai id the trachea- ai e bodily 
organs. Neither wound was superficial or shallow. Given the proximity of the wounds 
to major organs, their location on both sides of the victim's neck, their depth, and the 
degree of force evident behind both wounds, the jury could reasonably have determined 
thai Defendant intended in nniri;ill\ \u>nml t|i • victim if nut cut nf( h\< head,'1 
During the attack, after having struck his blows, Defendant made no attempt to 
stop the carnage but waited while Augustine continued stabbing the victim numerous 
The photographs of the knife wounds — which were admitted without 
objection by Defendant— and the evidence of the considerable amount of blood at 
the scene of the attack also suggest that the attack was accomplished with the 
type of ferocity indicative of an intent to kill. R. 171:114; R. 172:125. 
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times as the victim "scream[ed] bloody murder[.]" R. 171:136. Defendant fully expected 
the victim to die of his injuries and voiced surprise when he learned that the victim had 
survived. R. 171:113-15 (audiotape of Defendant saying he was "surprised that the kid is 
still alive"). In addition, he showed a lack of remorse in his encounters with Deputy 
Afatasi, Detective Adamson, and in the taped phone call with his friends when told of the 
extent of the victim's injuries. R. 171:107-13. 
The totality of this evidence—(even without the challenged photographs—belies 
Defendant's claim of accident and lack of intent to kill the victim. Instead, the other 
evidence demonstrates that Defendant intended his blows to be fatal and aimed them 
accordingly. Defendant admitted to police that he prompted Augustine into action, 
saying, "it's now or never." R. 171:89-90, 104. He chose and wielded an extremely 
dangerous weapon, intentionally swung it at a human being, hit his target twice on either 
side of his neck in extreme proximity to vital organs, and fully expected the victim to 
have died from the attack. The victim's survival was not the result of design but of 
providence. The injuries were not life-threatening only because the victim was not a bit 
closer to Defendant when he struck the blows. 
Given this evidence, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, the jury is not 
reasonably likely to have convicted Defendant of a lesser offense absent the photographs 
of the axe wounds. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted July 6,2010. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
IIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
NJCE.401 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 403 
RULE 401. DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
RULE 403 . EXCLUSION Ot RLLLVANr EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
ADDENDUM B 
ORDER ON DEFIiNDANTS 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
(R. 94-101; R. 176:24-29^ 
LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
STEPHEN L. NELSON, 9547 FILEB BISTRICT COURT 
MICHAEL S. COLBY, 8941 Third Judicial District 
Deputy District Attorneys , . . 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 JM,N ' J ««£ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 SALT LAKE o 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 Bv-
{Dptjjyty Clerk 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUN • "> ^ \ :'I- <')RiT A H 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
();< i ;i !< • -\ . >EFENDAN 1 h .v.. u U ! \ S 
Plaintiff, ) IN LIMINE 
-vs-
) 
SCOTT TYLER STAPLEY. < ',isi No, uS1'M)5"52 
) 
Defendant. Honorable Judith S.H. Atherton 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER CAME H f r ^ ? v ^ - : •• ! u a n . j ^e, 
determination of the defendant's motions in limine on January 12, 2009. Scott Wilson 
represented the Defendant Stephen I 1 Jelsoi I and M'ichael S, Colb\ , Deputy District 
Attorneys for Salt Lake County, represented the State. Based upon representations of 
counsel, the Court now makes and L'-I-; : .e •.:• \vinq: 
I. Findings of Fact 
u J^jjndant's property, a necklace depicting the "hatchetman" logo of the 
Psychopathic Records label, was found at the scene of the .-.'Te—;=*; 
2 1he defendant was apprehended and arrested after driving by the scene of the 
alleged offense in a car with a large "hatchetmai I" sticker in the rear w indow 
while police officers were processing the crime scene; 
3. The passenger of the defendant's car was found to be in possession of 
numerous weapons; 
4. The police also found other weapons in the car within the defendant's 
constructive possession; 
5. When the victim was taken to the hospital, a number of photos were taken of 
the victim's condition and the victim's injuries; 
6. These photos depict the wounds the victim received from the defendants, and 
the blood that covered these wounds; 
7. The photos are graphic, sobering, and may be possibly disturbing to some; 
8. After the defendant Stapley was arrested, police arrested the defendant 
Augustine and interviewed him, wherein he made statements admitting to 
participating in the alleged offense, and admitting to being a "juggalo;" 
9. According to Augustine's defense attorney, Augustine does not plan to testify 
at the trial, but rather plans to assert his privilege against self incrimination 
under the Fifth Amendment; 
10. This case has generated a substantial amount of pre-trial publicity; local 
television cameras and newspaper reporters have attended almost every 
hearing on this matter; 
11. In their written coverage of this case, both KSL and KTVX reference 
"juggalos." See http://www.abc4.com/ne ws/local/story/Two-men-attack-teen-
with-medieval-battle-ax/Uk9xwt6VHkCd2sNqTLVWBw.cspx. See also 
http://www.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=3896502; 
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example, a www.google.com search for "juggalo and axe and Utah" yields 
5360 hits. See 
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&rlz=lT4ADBF__enUS2"(H *s::~A-,. 
ggalo+axe+utah; 
13. Important to note, is that mum pi'nplc in the i nuniiniis ha\e strung feelings 
about this case. For example, 338 people have posted written comments about 
this I'iisf* on KM *s website site. See 
http://www.kslxom/index.php?nid=148&sid=3896502&comments==true; 
'j>e jomments express positive feelings or even solidarity with the 
defendants, and some comments are quite negative against the defendants., and 
against "juggalos" and "juggalo" culture generally. 
ill Conclusions of" I. aw 
1. The Utah Rules of Evidence define "relevant evidence" as "evidence 
h;!\ing.n^ * ,r»^-^ • • .. • _ i-.\ e- -ic; ,- ^ : a-^  : JCI :hat is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable ... than 
il would he w itliout the evidence." -• ;al; K. i \ .d 401; 
a. "[A] 11 relevant evidence is admissible [in Utah courts], except as 
othei wise provided ... id. At 402 Utah appellate courts give trial 
courts considerable discretion in deciding wk-ilv* : • .• '/ -. • 
submitted by a party is relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 
1286 (Utah 1976); 
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b. The Utah Rules of Evidence allow trial courts to exclude relevant 
evidence "... if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury.. ." Utah R. Evid. 403; 
c. Because the defendant was wearing his "hatchetman" necklace during 
the attack on the victim (and left the necklace at the scene of the 
crime), and because the police were able to connect the defendant to 
the crime scene by his "hatchetman" sticker in the rear window of his 
car, both the defendant's "hatchetman" necklace and "hatchetman" car 
sticker are relevant to the trial in this case, and therefore admissible; 
d. The State's witnesses, however, may not refer to these pieces of 
evidence as related to "juggalos" or "gang activity." In fact, the word 
"gang" may not be used at all in the State's presentation of its case; 
2. The Utah Rules of Evidence provide that the "credibility of a witness 
may be attacked by any party..." Utah R. Evid. 607. Specifically, 
"[b]ias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to 
impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by 
evidence otherwise adduced." Utah R. Evid. 608; 
a. The Utah Supreme Court has said that juries need sufficient 
information to fully appraise a witness's biases and motivations. State 
v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987); 
b. "Juggalos" are a tight-knit community, and refer to each other as a 
"family;" 
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If the defense witnesses are "j uggal ^  ''•••*. ^ ; ^  v : - m - - * n 
protecting the defendant and shielding him from culpability through 
their tesliiiinm \ much ilu State usable lo explore in cross examination 
so that the jury may determine whether the witness is biased; 
ll r. important ilui the voir dire process in this case will ensure 
fairness for both parties; 
If a prospective juror is especially sympathetic towards "juggalos," or 
especially hostile towards "juggalos," il eoukl impact their abiiih to 
impartially act as a juror in this case; 
Because this Coi irt, therefore, is interested in ki low ing what prior 
knowledge and feelings towards "juggalos" prospective jurors will 
briny to tliLi .oo-c, ill's ( , (mil is authorizing the voir dire process in this 
case to include questions about jurors' knowledge of "juggalos" and 
"juggalo" culture; • • 
If a defendant objects to photographs of a victim's injuries offered by 
the State on the basis that the photographs are likely to inflame the 
jury based on their graphic depictions, ti uil courts must first determine 
whether a photo is relevant, and then whether the photo is a gruesome 
photograph; 
A photograph is relevant if it meets the standards of Rules 401, 402, 
and 403 of the {'tab Rules of Evidence, described above. 
State v. Vargas, 20 P.3d 271, sets forth a four-pronged test for 
determining whether a photograph is gruesome: 
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i. First, whether the photograph in color or black and white; 
ii. Second, whether the photograph an enlargement; 
iii. Third, whether the photograph is taken at the crime scene or 
some other place; and 
iv. Fourth, whether there are other details in the photograph, aside 
from the victim, that render a photograph gruesome; 
c. The photographs in this case are relevant under the applicable Rules of 
Evidence because the State is required to show that the defendant 
acted with the specific intent to kill the victim; 
d. The photographs offered by the State do not meet all the Vargas 
criteria, and should therefore be admissible; 
e. Specifically, while the photos are in color and are enlargements, the 
bdliAJiuJ JcmjuiU-t fibyiX^y^ AJJ^/^K J 
photographs were taken at a hospitalas opposed to the ci^ lme scene andU 
do not depict any other details (aside from the victim) that render the 
^/photograph gruesome; * . 
/ . The State, (Howiver, may nA* oner duplicative photogralpy during the U 
I \ presentation of its case; 
Assuming the co-defendant Augustine asserts his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination, he can be declared "unavailable" 
under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence; 
a. In that case, any statement made by Augustine against his interest 
would be admissible at Stapley's trial; 
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b. Relevant statements made by Augustine that would be against his 
interest under Rule 804, and therefore admissible in Stapley's trial, 
would include Augustine's admission to being a "juggalo" because 
that statement indicates his bias, and interest in protecting Stapley as a 
fellow member of the "juggalo" family. 
Based upon the above-referenced Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
defendants Mc>tion in Limine is denied in part and granted in part. This matter is 
scheduled for jury trial on January 13-15, 2009. 
DA I ED this [1 day of A Wz ,2009. 
HE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \g> day of , W A / J A ^ V 2009, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing State's Response to Defendant's Motion in Limine was delivered 
to: 
Scott Wilson 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
L-J V^K-> O ^ Li / ! LU ^ -X> 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE 
SCOTT 
OF UTAH, 
TYLER 
VS 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
STAPLEY, ) 
DEFENDANT. ) 
Case No. 081905752 
MOTION HEARING 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
JANUARY 12, 2009 
REPORTED BY: Susan S. Sprouse, RPR, CSR B^ 
FILED DESTEICT CGURT 
Third Judtcol District 
OCT 2 1 20CS 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
U9Pu'ty fertflT 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
*4L OCT 2 72009 jioQznMJA 
show that it was intentional conduct. So there's no necessity 
or relevance as to whether it was accidental or intentional. 
It just goes to whether these are gruesome photographs and 
whether they — yes, they have same probative value. And that 
probative value can be attained as well through, as I stated 
earlier, through diagrams, drawings, or descriptions, short of 
introduction of these gruesome photographs. And it doesn't 
keep the State from showing the probative value of what 
occurred. It just — it's so gruesome that the jury cannot 
help but be inflamed by those photographs and unfairly 
prejudice my client. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
All right. So let's start with the gang designation. 
I'm denying that motion. I'll permit the questions on voir 
dire as requested and will see how the testimony is — comes 
out with regard to other motions. I will require that no — 
the word "gang" not be used, but I think it is appropriate that 
there be some inquiry with regard to the word "Juggalo" for 
those jury selection purposes. 
MR. WILSON: Just for jury, but, or — 
MR. NELSON: Well, your Honor, I've said all along, 
I've instructed all our witnesses already not to use the word 
"gang" at any point during their testimony in the trial. So I 
don't anticipate that will be a problem. And I'm happy to 
remind then again about that. 
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THE COURT: All right. And what about Juggalo? I — 
certainly it!s relevant, but primarily I think the relevance 
would go to the defense case. You may bring in — I think 
itTs — the hatchetman symbols, both on the necklace and the — 
MR. NELSON: Sticker. 
THE COURT: — sticker are certainly admissible. 
MR. WILSON: Why is that admissible? 
THE COURT: They are admissible. 
MR. WILSON: But why? 
THE COURT: Because by entering a plea of not guilty, 
you put at issue every element of the crime. And the State is 
permitted to put on its case, and its case has to do with 
investigation prior to Mr. Stapleyfs admission to what he did. 
So ~ 
MR. WILSON: But ~ 
THE COURT: — that is — 
MR. WILSON: — the photograph on the car comes after 
his admission. 
THE COURT: It is relevant. I mean, it's admissible. 
There's — that's not even a close call. 
I don't see the necessity, however, to use the term 
"Juggalos" in the case in chief. If the door is opened by the 
defense case, it's opened, and you may pursue that. 
MR. NELSON: And I'm sorry to interrupt you when you 
are making a ruling here, but I just want to make sure we 
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prepare our witnesses in a way that's conforms with this 
ruling. Would you have a problem with the detective who found 
the necklace and then watched the car drive by and saw the 
sticker on it, would you have a problem with him testifying 
about a connection he made in his mind that this is a symbol 
from a band or something like that — 
THE COURT: No, that's fine. 
MR. NELSON: — that symbols were similar and said to 
himself I need to stop that car? 
THE COURT: No, I think that's fine. 
MR. NELSON: Just don't use the word "Juggalo". 
THE COURT: Yeah, with the Juggalo — yeah, your 
argument really was — went to prejudice and bias in the 
testimony of defense witnesses, but making a connection, the 
evidentiary connection, there is no problem with that. I have 
no problem. 
MR. NELSON: Thank you. 
THE COURT: With regard to the testimony of the 
weapons and the car, I'm granting the motion. You've already 
stipulated not to do, relative to those found on Mr. Bird, was 
it? 
MR. COLBY: Right. 
THE COURT: But I'm also granting the motion for the 
State in chief with regard to all the weapons in the car that 
had nothing to do with this offense. 
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With regard to the photographs, under Vargas, I'm 
making the following findings: I find first that the prong 
No. 1 is met, that itTs color as opposed to black and white. 
No. 2 is met, enlargement or close-up. 
No. 3, no. "When taken in relation to the crime, it 
depicts the victim actually in a more sanitized position than 
would have been had he been photographed — photographs of him 
at the crime scene had been admitted. So I don't believe that 
that meets — that that is met. 
And No. 4, other details in the photograph aside from 
the victim render the photos gruesome. No, I don't find that 
either. So I'm finding that two of the four prongs have been 
met or indicia that I have to look at. 
I find further that these photographs are relevant. 
I'm finding that they are very graphic and very sobering, but 
not gruesome. I further find that their probative value is 
extremely high and not substantially outweighed by unfair 
prejudice. So I'm permitting their admission. 
However, I am also requiring that you not submit all 
of these. These are duplicative. I want you to minimize. For 
instance, the hand ones, I don't think are — even really fall 
under the gruesomeness test substantially, but they do show 
what appears to be a defensive wound. That's admissible. But 
one is enough of these wounds. I mean, there are four or five 
with regard to that wound in the back of the head. I simply 
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will have you limit it to one photograph of each. One 
photograph of — close-up photograph of that, the back of the 
head. One, there were two photographs of the injury to — 
well, over the heart essentially. And that's probative again 
to his intent. But I don't think you need both photographs. 
There are two that are quite similar, one where he's washed up 
and one he is not. 
MR. NELSON: Your Honor, if I could just, and some of 
these wounds were made with a weapon that the co-defendant had 
on him. However, it's going to be the State's theory that 
these two folks are parties to this case and acted together. 
So there may be some photographs that seem to be knife wounds 
as opposed to axe wounds. 
THE COURT: Yes. That's — that certainly goes to 
it. So that's what I am saying that I'm requiring — 
MR. NELSON: We can do that, your Honor. 
THE COURT: — that you choose one for each of those 
primary — those big wounds — 
MR. NELSON: Not a problem. 
THE COURT: — and limit the exposure. I think — I 
don't know how this is going to go, frankly, because I think 
these are very disturbing. Have you gotten proposed voir dire 
that addresses the issue of photographs? Have you given me any 
questions? 
MR. NELSON: I have not, but I think that's an 
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excellent idea, and I can work on some of those this afternoon, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: I definitely need to do that. With 
regard to the — I'm not sure there's a lot of dispute. 
MR. WILSON: Well, judge, are you going to allow the 
questions about Juggalos if there's not going to be any mention 
of Juggalos, just the sign? 
THE COURT: What do you mean? 
MR. WILSON: Well, he's asked in his proposed voir 
dire to ask the jury about Juggalos. 
THE COURT: Yeah, I'm going to do that. 
MR. WILSON: But he's not going to — 
THE COURT: One question: Have you heard about them? 
If so — 
MR. WILSON: I have an objection to that because if 
they — then it ties in, ties together — 
THE COURT: Okay. But look, that — there is a 
likelihood that that information will come in. And it will 
come in, perhaps, on your case. And I don't want to taint — I 
donTt want to have a tainted jury that I won't discover until 
the defense case. And that's why I'm permitting those 
questions. I have to cover as many bases as I can. 
And we'll address the issue with regard to 
Mr. Augustine's testimony should he fail to appear on the 
subpoena or if — 
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